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Stories about foreign migrants – legal, illegal and asylum seekers -- appear almost daily
in the news. Governments in Europe, North America and Australia note these events with alarm
and grapple with policy reforms aimed at selecting certain migrants and keeping out others.
Economists appear to be well armed to advise the debate since they are responsible for an
impressive literature that examines the characteristics of individual immigrants, their absorption
and the consequences of their migration on the sending and receiving regions involved.
Economists are, however, much less well armed to speak to the determinants of the migration
flows that give rise to public alarm.
This paper offers a quantitative assessment of the economic and demographic
fundamentals that drive world migration, not just in one country or at one point in time but across
different historical epochs and around the world. The paper is organized around three questions:
•   How do the standard theories of migration perform when confronted with evidence drawn
from more than a century of world migration experience?
•   In an intentional effort to reverse the Stolper-Samuelson causal direction that has become so
common in modern debate, how do inequality and poverty influence international migration?
•   Is it useful to distinguish between migration pressure and migration ex-post, or between the
potential demand for visas and the actual use of them?
The next section provides some background motivation. We then outline a basic theoretical
framework to guide us through the specification and interpretation of models that explain rates of
international migration. Drawing on our previous research, we examine the key economic and
demographic fundamentals that drove the European mass emigration in the half-century before
1914. Having identified the fundamentals that drove world migration in an era when potential
migrants were relatively unconstrained by policy intervention, we turn to US immigration over2
the last three decades when policy intervention has been a fact of life. These two examples raise
issues about emigration from very poor countries, and so we next turn to migration from and
within Africa. Finally, we explore the determinants of migration on a global database and
conclude with speculations about the future trends in world migration.
Themes Surrounding World Migration
There is widespread agreement that globalization has been on the rise in the half century
since World War II. “Rising globalization” is interpreted to mean that the mobility of goods and
factors across international borders has reached new and unprecedented heights. However, the
international mobility of goods and capital is probably no greater than it was a century ago
(O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; Lindert and Williamson 2002; Obstfeld and Taylor 2002;
O’Rourke and Findlay 2002). In contrast, what used to be “free” world migration has become
tightly constrained by tough immigration policies that undoubtedly suppress a vast amount of
potential migration that might otherwise have taken place (Chiswick and Hatton 2002).
Evidence compiled by the United Nations suggests that the number of people around the
world who were living in a country other than the one in which they were born rose from 75
million in 1965 to 120 million in 1990. Although these absolute numbers have certainly
increased, world migrants represented just 2.3 percent of world population at both dates (Zlotnick
1998: p. 431). Even if the share increased a bit during the 1990s, these statistics hardly speak of a
dramatic increase in globalization as it applies to world migration. Part of the reason that these
figures seem inconsistent with common perception is that migrant (foreign-born) stocks in less
developed countries have fallen. In any case, the more relevant point is that migrant stocks in the
developed world increased from 3.1 to 4.5 percent between 1965 and 1990. In North America,
western Europe and Australasia combined, the increase has been even more pronounced, rising
from 4.9 to 7.6 percent over the same twenty-five years, an increase of 2.7 percentage points.3
This measure of the rising globalization of world labor markets is certainly impressive, but the
rise in these migrant stock shares is still smaller than the rise in the trade/GDP ratio (Findlay and
O’Rourke 2002) or the foreign capital/world capital stock ratio (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002).
Another reason why the rise in migrant stock shares has been smaller is that temporary and return
migration have become much more common: thus, gross flows have increased faster than net
flows.
No matter how the ex-post world migration figures are interpreted, migration pressure
seems to have been on the increase. One indicator is the long queues of applicants for
immigration to developed countries. In 1994 the waiting list for admission to the United States
totalled 3.6 million (Smith and Edmonston 1997: p. 45).  Another obvious symptom of this
pressure is the surge in illegal immigration, most prominently across the southern border of the
United States and into western Europe from the east and the south. About 300,000 illegal
immigrants enter the US every year while 400,000 to 500,000 enter western Europe. It is
estimated that illegals add ten or fifteen percent to the stock of foreign-born in OECD countries.
Another symptom is the rise in those seeking asylum in developed countries. According to
UNHCR statistics there were 560,000 asylum applications to 28 industrialized countries in 2000,
with about a million awaiting decision. These figures have soared in the last 20 years and it seems
clear that the demand for asylum has increased far faster than the supply of visas offered these
refugees.
1
So why has the pressure on world migration been on the rise? What economic and
demographic fundamentals have been at work? Do we expect those fundamentals to rise even
more in the future, or to abate?
                                                          
1 There were 650,450 asylum applications in 1982-6 for 17 countries in western Europe, rising to 1,931,900
in 1997-2001. For the same periods, the number granted refugee status under the 1951 Geneva Convention
rose from 183,550 to 221,200, while those granted humanitarian status outside the Convention rose from
27,200 to 206,050. Thus acceptances under these two headings accounted for a third of applications in
1982-6 but only a quarter in 1997-2001.4
A wide variety of approaches have been used to attack these questions (Massey et al.
1993), but the underlying theory used in seeking answers often has its shortcomings. We have
tried to improve the quality of the answers in three ways. First, most of the theories of migration
which all of us find useful deal with a world without immigration controls. This serious
shortcoming can be repaired only if we can figure out how to integrate policy into migration
models, and then to estimate what difference it would make to our predictions. What makes this
agenda so difficult is that immigration policy is itself endogenous, probably influenced by the
same forces that drive world migration pressure. One way to get useful answers to this question
about fundamentals is to compare the experience in the age of “free” migration before 1914 with
“constrained” migration of more recent times.
Second, the recent empirical literature has focused extensively on the effects of migration
selectivity on immigrant outcomes. This literature examines the qualifications and labor market
quality of immigrants upon arrival, and their subsequent economic assimilation relative to the
native-born. Assimilation experience is seen as reflecting the effects of economic incentives and
immigration policy on the selectivity of immigrants by individual attributes and country of origin.
This literature has been long on examining immigrant labor market performance but short on
verifying the underlying model of migration by which this performance is interpreted.
Third, it is often observed that emigration from poor countries increases as economic
development takes place in the source country. This was certainly true of the nineteenth century
(Hatton and Williamson 1998: Ch. 3), and a glance at the immigration statistics of OECD
countries today confirms that the poorest countries typically generate fewer emigrants than those
that are further up the per capita income ladder. This common observation does not seem to be
consistent with the notion that migration is driven by the gap between income at home and
abroad. Instead, observers have detected a hump-shaped relationship between economic
development at home and emigration (Massey 1988; Hatton and Williamson 1998: Ch. 3; Stalker
2000: Ch. 7): thus, emigration rates out of really poor countries are very low, while they are much5
higher out of moderately poor countries. One possible explanation for the paradox is that the
structural and demographic changes coincident with industrialization generate more migration in
early stages than later on. Another, not necessarily competing, explanation is that poverty
constrains migration since financing investment in a long-distance move is difficult for the very
poor. Thus, any “catching up” increase in incomes at home serves to relax the poverty constraint
on emigration, and this positive effect may dominate the negative effect associated with any
narrowing of the income gap between home and abroad.
Migration Theory
The application of theory to world migration provides a useful guide to the variables that
might be expected to influence migration pressure and ex post migration quantities. Important
contributions have been made by Sjaastad (1962), Borjas (1987, 1989), and others.
2 In the
simplest framework, the decision of individual i (i = 1…n) in source country h to migrate to
destination country f can be expressed as:
0 , , > − − − = c z w w d i i h i f i (1)
where wf,i, wh,i are the earnings of that individual in destination (f for foreign) and source (h for
home) countries respectively, zi is the individual’s compensating differential in favor of h, and c
is the direct cost of migration. This comparison can be viewed in terms of utility if, for example,
utility is logarithmic and the variables are expressed as natural logs. Clearly, individual i is more
likely to migrate the higher is the destination wage and the lower are the home wage, the
compensating differential, and the fixed migration cost. If the first three terms are interpreted as
                                                          
2 One important strand of theory considers migration as a household decision rather than an individual
decision; e.g. Mincer (1978), Stark (1991). That strand of the literature is not considered here, partly to6
present values then the likelihood of migration will decline with the age of individual i as the
remaining working life becomes shorter. Thus, for a given incentive, migration will be higher the
more the source population is skewed towards the younger working ages.
The recent literature has focused on other elements of selectivity in migration. Let
individuals in the source country have skill levels indexed by sh,i, with mean µ sh and variance σ
2
sh.
Incomes at the destination and the source are represented respectively as:
; , i f f i f s w β α + = ; , i h h i h s w β α + = (2)
with means and variances, respectively, µ wf, µ wh, σ wf, σ wh. Substituting into (1):
c z s d i i h f h f i − − − + − = ) ( β β α α (3)
Thus, migration will increase with skill-level (migrants will be positively selected) if the return to
skills is greater in the destination than the source (β f  > β h), and migration will decrease with skill
level (migrants will be negatively selected) if the return to skills is greater in the source.
Following Borjas (1989), if si and zi are normally distributed the migration rate from the
source country to the destination can be expressed as:
d
z wh wf c
D
σ
µ µ µ ) (
1
+ + + −
Φ − = (4)
where µ z is the mean of zi, σ d is the standard deviation of di, and Φ  is the cumulative distribution
function of the standard normal. Because σ d is a function of the variances of the source and
destination wage distributions, σ wf and σ wh, (and therefore of the underlying parameters β f and β h),
                                                                                                                                                                            
maintain simplicity and partly because the empirical sections that follow deal with aggregate migration, not7
the migration rate depends on the wage distributions as well as on their means, with an effect that
will be non-monotonic. If the destination is “richer” than the source (in the sense that µ wf > µ wh +
µ z + c), it can be shown that the migration will be an inverse ‘u’ shaped function of σ h/σ f.
3
Note that there is no separate effect for the average skill level (µ sh) in this model, unless it
appears for reasons not considered so far. However, the destination wage or income variable often
used in empirical studies is typically the average for all workers at the destination; not the average
wage that would be received by the source country workers, if employed in the destination. The
former can be written as:
) (
*
sh sf f wf wf µ µ β µ µ − − = (5)
where µ
*
wf is the mean wage of the destination workforce and µ sf is their mean skill level. If (5) is
substituted into the migration equation (4) then relative skill levels will matter with an effect that
reflects the return to skills at the destination.
Much of the literature suggests that non-economic factors are important in migration
decisions. Such effects are represented here in the individual-specific compensating differential zi.
One important influence on zi is the stock of previous migrants from the source country living in
the destination—the so-called friends and relatives effect. The effects of social networks on
migration have been widely studied but they should not be viewed as some alternative to the
economic model of migration. Consider two economic interpretations of the friends and relatives
effect. One is that it increases destination-specific utility, perhaps also reducing the loss of ethnic
                                                                                                                                                                            
distinguishing between households and individuals.
3 In the case where si and zi are independently distributed the maximum occurs at the point where σ h/σ f = 1.
The effects of income distribution have rather different effects in the analysis of Stark and Taylor (1991).
They posit that migration is positively related to the degree of relative deprivation among potential
migrants at the source. In this case only income inequality at the source should matter and it should have a
monotonically positive effect on the probability of migration. For migration within and from Mexico (to the8
capital that might otherwise be incurred in migration. The second interpretation is that immigrant
networks reduce migration costs directly, implying an individual-level reduction in c. The
immigrant network can relax the poverty constraint on potential migrants by providing access to
loans or outright gifts.
A key feature of migration decisions is the presence of policies that restrict immigration
to destination countries. They can be thought of as two types: quotas that restrict numbers (by
source country or in total) or policies that select immigrants according to certain characteristics
(with or without a cap on numbers). Both can be seen as raising the costs of immigration. In the
former, competition for visas raises costs both directly and through queuing. In the latter, the
costs are those associated with the acquisition of the relevant characteristics. Two key elements of
immigration policy are family reunification and selection by skill. Adding these policy-related
components of costs, the individual’s decision can be represented as:
i i i h i f i v c z w w d + − − − =
*
, , (6)
Here the fixed cost of migration c has been modified (now denoted c*) to include the costs
imposed by immigration policy and the additional term vi reflects the lowering of immigration
costs associated with individual characteristics. If the individual has close relatives at the
destination then this will raise the value of vi. If immigration policy is skill-selective then vi will
be a function of the individual’s skill level. Thus the aggregate migration rate will depend on
average skill-level independently of the effects operating through source and destination
earnings.
4
                                                                                                                                                                            
US) Stark and Taylor obtained an inverse ‘u’ shaped relation between their relative deprivation index and
the probability of migration to the US—a result they attribute to the poverty constraint (see further below).
4 The aggregate migration equation (4) can be easily modified to incorporate immigration policy (Clark,
Hatton and Williamson 2002: Appendix 1). This alters the (non-monotonic) effects of income distribution
on migration such that the maximum occurs where σ h/σ f > 1 in the case where policy is positively skill-9
In the presence of high migration costs--imposed by policy or otherwise--potential
migrants in poor countries may be constrained by their poverty. For a given (fixed and
appropriately normalized) cost threshold c










Thus the higher is mean income and the lower is the standard deviation of income, the smaller the
proportion of potential migrants that will be poverty constrained. Clearly the poverty constraint is
not independent of the migration decision and it would be mitigated by the relaxation of credit
constraints, but the most important channel for relaxing the credit constraint it likely to be
through remittances from previous migrants.
The Age of European Mass Emigration
The age of mass migration before the First World War gives us an opportunity to look at
the economic and demographic fundamentals that drove international migration in a period of
relatively free and unrestricted immigration. More than 50 million migrants departed Europe for
the New World between 1820 and 1913. About three fifths went to the United States and the
remainder to Canada, South America, Australasia, and southern Africa. In the first three decades
after 1846 the figure averaged around 300,000 per annum, doubling in the following two decades,
and exceeding a million by the turn of the century. In the first half of the century, Britain was the
dominant source of the migrants. These were joined in mid-century by a stream of emigrants from
Germany followed by a rising tide from Scandinavia and elsewhere in northwestern Europe.
                                                                                                                                                                            
selective. For an analysis of the effects of skill-selective immigration policy in a household context, see
Cobb-Clark (1998).10
Emigration surged from southern and eastern Europe from the 1880s—accounting for most of the
increase in total European emigration. It came first from Italy and parts of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and then from the 1890s it included Poland, Russia, Spain and Portugal.
After mid-century the migrants were typically young and single and about two thirds of
them were male. More than three quarters of the immigrants entering the United States were aged
16-40, at a time when 42 percent of the US population was in this age group. While the young
and single might be more adventurous and enterprising, they certainly had the most to gain from
the move. They were also relatively (and increasingly) unskilled, a fact that largely reflects shifts
in the origin-country composition of the flow. And, once the mass migration took hold, a large
proportion moved through migrant networks to join friends and relatives who had previously
migrated to the same destination. Although some moved in response to famines, persecution, and
political upheaval, the characteristics of the migrants reinforce the premise that the vast majority
moved in response to economic incentives--maximizing the gains and minimizing the costs.
Emigration rates varied widely across Europe in the late nineteenth century. The highest
rates were from Ireland, averaging 13 per thousand per annum between 1850 and 1913. Norway
and Sweden had emigration rates approaching five per thousand from 1870 to 1913, while those
from Germany were under two per thousand and France was close to zero. These emigration rates
also display different trends. Emigration from Ireland declined from the 1860s, and from
Germany and Norway it declined from the 1880s. Almost at the same time emigration from Italy
and Spain began a steep ascent, a trend that was halted only by the outbreak of war. A challenge
to any theory of migration is to explain not only the differences in average rates of emigration
across countries, but also the different trends in these rates.
5
In a recent study (Hatton and Williamson 1998: Ch. 3), we explained decade-average
emigration rates pooled across 12 European countries between 1860 and 1913 as a function of11
four key fundamentals (Table 1). The share of the labor force in agriculture is interpreted as a
measure of differential mobility between urban and rural populations. The effect is weakly
negative providing a little support for the view that rural populations were less internationally
mobile. More important is the wage gap as represented by the purchasing power parity adjusted
real wage in the source country relative to that for a weighted average of destinations. Note that
these wage data are for homogenous occupations across countries, so there is less need to add a
measure of average education or skills (and in any case we have no adequate measure of the
return to skills). The effect of the home-to-destination wage ratio is strongly negative and the
coefficient implies that, in the long run, a ten percent increase in the wage ratio raised the annual
emigration rate by 0.7 per thousand. The birthrate lagged 20 years stands as a proxy for the young
adult cohort size. Its effect is positive, and it is large—suggesting that up to half of additional
births ultimately spilled over into emigration. Of course, demographic forces can have two effects
on emigration: directly, by raising the young adult share; and indirectly, by glutting the home
labor market and thus worsening employment conditions there. Finally, a bigger stock of previous
emigrants raised current emigration as the friends and relatives effect would predict: for every
1000 previous emigrants, 20 more were ‘pulled’ abroad every year.
Some observers have suggested that the typical European country went through an
emigration cycle that followed an inverted ‘U’ shape (Akerman 1976; Massey 1988; Hatton and
Williamson 1998). As industrial and demographic revolutions unfolded, emigration rates first
rose and then fell. Such a pattern can be detected in our data, although for a number of countries
it was abruptly ended by the First World War and the immigration restrictions that followed. This
stylized pattern can be explained as follows. Demographic effects, aided by urbanization and the
growing migrant stock, were important forces in the upswing of the cycle. Later on, these forces
                                                                                                                                                                            
5 There was a wave of studies in the 1960s and 1970s and these are critically surveyed in Gould (1979). A
second wave of studies in the 1990s is represented by some of the contributions in Hatton and Williamson
(1994).12
weakened and were more than offset by strong convergence of European real wages on those in
the New World.
It has been argued that instead of, or in addition to, the forces just mentioned, European
emigration patterns were driven by the progressive relaxation of the poverty constraint as
economic development raised living standards. Industrialization spread from west to east, as did
emigration. Faini and Venturini (1994) found that the sharp rise in Italian emigration from the
1880s could be explained by rising real wages at home—an effect which dominated the negative
influence of the rising home-to-destination wage ratio. In contrast, we could find only very
weakly-positive home wage effects in our cross-country panel, probably because it was
dominated by observations from the relatively prosperous European northwest where the poverty
constraint was less binding than in Italy and where it was also mitigated by loans from friends
and relatives who had previously emigrated.
These facts may help explain the contrasting emigration trends in Ireland and Italy—two
equally poor countries on the periphery of industrial Europe. In the case of Ireland the famine that
ejected a million emigrants produced an emigrant stock abroad that provided the bridge for
further waves. The annual emigration rate was 19 per thousand in the 1850s but it trended
downwards as, for the following half century, Irish real wages rose strongly compared with those
in Britain and the New World. In Italy, by contrast, gradually rising real wages and the
cumulating emigrant stock abroad both served to progressively release the poverty constraint and
emigration rose strongly as a result.
What Drives Immigrants to the United States?
In an age when world migration has become severely constrained by policy, the US has
remained the leading destination country. After falling to a low in the 1930s, immigration to the
US grew from an annual average of 252,000 in the 1950s to 916,000 in the 1990s. This growth13
was accompanied by a radical shift in the source-country composition. In the 1950s, Europeans
accounted for more than half of all immigrants and these were overwhelmingly from western
Europe (Table 2). The proportion from relatively rich western Europe declined sharply to a mere
5.7 percent in the 1990s while that from relatively poor eastern Europe nearly doubled. The
counterpart to the decline in the European share was the rise in the Asian share which exceeded a
third in the 1970s and 1980s – another shift from rich to poor immigrant source – and a rise in the
share from the American continent which increased from 40 percent in the 1950s to 50 percent in
the 1990s. Within the Americas the decline in the proportion from rich Canada was more than
compensated by increases from poor Central America, the Caribbean and especially Mexico. The
poorest continent, Africa, accounts for only a small share of US immigrants although that share
has grown rapidly.
Policy has been important. The dominance of Europe was reinforced by national origins
quotas until the 1960s. They were originally introduced in 1921 and 1924, and they strongly
favored the countries that dominated the inflow during the nineteenth century, particularly
Britain, Ireland and Germany. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration Act abolished the
national origins criteria, replacing it with separate quotas for the western and eastern
hemispheres, and with a system of preferences that emphasized family reunification. The
hemispheric ceilings were combined into a worldwide quota in 1979. The Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 introduced mass legalization of immigrants who had resided in the US
since 1982. Finally, the 1990 Immigration Act (effective 1992) raised the overall immigration
quota and introduced a new system of preferences that allocated a larger share of available visas
by occupational attributes rather than by family reunification.
Repeating a contentious debate that took place from the 1890s to WWI, there has been
much modern debate about the changing composition of US immigrants and its impact. It has
been forcefully argued that the labor market quality of successive cohorts of immigrants, as
reflected in education levels, entry wages, and rates of assimilation, declined between the 1950s14
and the 1980s (Borjas 1987, 1994, 1999), just as it was argued that the quality of US immigrants
fell between the 1870s and WWI (Hatton and Williamson 1998). This modern trend is seen
largely as the result of the 1965 Amendments that abolished the quotas. Opening the door to
poorer parts of the world produced a much larger pool of potential immigrants for whom the
income gains far outweighed compensating differentials favoring the home country. As a result of
their lower skill levels, the new immigrants were located further down the US income distribution
than were previous immigrants. More speculatively, to the extent that the return to skills (as
reflected in income inequality) was greater in source countries than in the US, there would be
negative selection from within each source country,
6 reinforcing the downward trend in the skills
of the average US immigrant. Earlier postwar waves of European immigrants, coming from
countries with income distributions more equal than the US, should have been positively selected.
Finally, an immigration policy which favored family reunification, gradually lowered the costs of
immigration for successive cohorts of migrants from these ‘new’ source countries. Thus, US
immigration policy had exactly the opposite impact intended: it served to hasten the switch in
immigrant source towards poorer countries.
The most lively debate on US immigration has been about assimilation outcomes.
Although the framework used in these studies is underpinned by the migrant selection model, the
determinants of the immigration flow itself have been comparatively neglected. Thus, it is unclear
to what degree the forces that drive US immigration are consistent with the interpretations placed
on assimilation outcomes. Existing studies of the determinants of immigration by source country
have failed to test properly the specification implied by the theoretical discussion above.
7
                                                          
6 Ramos (1992) finds evidence for negative selection among migrants to the US from Puerto Rico and for
positive selection among return migrants. However Chiswick (2000) has argued that a fixed migration cost
will be larger in proportion to the prospective gains for low skilled migrants, leading to positive selection.
Funkhauser (1992) finds this to be the case for prospective illegal immigrants from El Salvador: given the
high fixed cost, the net gains are greater for those with higher education.
7 There is, however, an extensive literature originating with Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) that estimates
migration and wage equations simultaneously in the context of inter-regional migration. Ramos (1992) uses
this approach for migration from Puerto Rico to the US, although here too there are no immigration
controls.15
Nevertheless, these studies have provided some useful insights. For a cross section of source-
country average emigration rates to the US for 1951-80, Borjas (1987) found that migration was
negatively related to source-country income per capita and to source-country inequality. Yang
(1995) confirmed the negative source-country income effect in a cross section of emigration rates
to the US for the shorter period 1982-6, but found that the stock of previous immigrants was the
single most important determinant. More recently, Kamemera et al. (2000) used panel data for the
decade 1976-86, including a wide range of variables both for the United States and source
countries. Distance, relative income, and US unemployment all mattered, but migration was also
positively related to measures of political rights and individual freedom in source countries and
negatively related to political instability.
In recent (and ongoing) work with Ximena Clark we have developed a model that
attempts to explore these issues more directly. Our dataset is a panel of immigration rates into the
US from 81 countries over the years 1971-1998. One variant of this model appears in Table 3.
The relative income variable is purchasing power parity adjusted per capita income and, for that
reason, relative skill levels are also included as proxied by years of education. These variables
produce significant coefficients with negative and positive signs respectively, and they matter
quantitatively.  For example, the net effect of lower levels of income and education in South
America compared to western Europe is to raise the typical South American country’s migration
rate by 25 percent over that of western Europe. The coefficients on the return to skills, as proxied
by relative inequality, also strongly support the Roy model for the case where the destination
country is relatively rich. The quadratic peaks with relative inequality at 1.33, and with an effect
that raises immigration from the typical South American country by 46 percent over that of the
typical western European country. The share of source country population in the 15-29 age range
has a positive effect but its impact is more modest. It raises migration rates from South America
by 11 percent over those from western Europe.16
Other variables also have strong effects in the expected direction. Adding a thousand
miles to distance from Chicago reduces the migration rate from a country by about a fifth, being
landlocked reduces it by more than a third, while being predominantly English speaking raises it
by a factor of 3. The stock of previous immigrants from a source country residing in the US per
thousand of the source country population has a significant effect. Evaluated at the mean, the
coefficients imply that an addition of 1000 to the migrant stock increases the annual flow of
immigrants by 26—an order of magnitude comparable with that found for nineteenth century
Europe (20). The coefficients imply that the stock of previous migrants raises South American
migration by 49 percent (high stock to population ratio) compared with East Asia (low stock to
population ratio). This difference is itself the cumulative result of past migration rates. History
matters.
What about poverty? Here we use a trickling-down proxy for the source country poverty
rate -- the ratio of the country’s gini coefficient of household income to the square of its income
per capita. At a given mean income, a rise in inequality increases the poverty rate, whereas for a
given level of inequality, a rise in mean income reduces the poverty rate.
8 This proxy variable has
a negative effect (Pov: Table 3) so that absolute poverty reduces migration to the US. Thus, a rise
in source-country per capita income has two effects on US immigration: a negative effect
operating through the relative income variable, and a positive effect operating through the poverty
variable.
9 Furthermore, these effects depend on the initial income level. For a typical West
European country, a ten percent rise in GDP per capita (holding education constant) reduces
migration to the US by 12.6 percent. A ten percent rise in income would reduce migration from
the typical East Asian country by 4.3 percent and from the typical South American country by 3.7
percent. But for the typical African country, a ten percent rise in income per capita increases
                                                          
8 Ravallion (2001) reports an elasticity of the change in the share in poverty with respect to the change in
mean private consumption expenditure of around −  2 across a set of less developed countries.
9 We note with interest the recent findings reported by Sala-I-Matin (2002) that poverty rates have been
falling world wide since 1960.17
migration to the US by 0.3 percent. Looking at the poverty effect alone (i.e. assuming income
also rose by ten percent in the US) there would be virtually no effect on the West European
country but a 2 percent rise in migration from the African country.
It should be stressed, however, that all of these effects are measured in the presence of a
quota on total immigration. Thus while they may be a reasonable guide to the effect of changes in
domestic conditions in a single source country, they would be a misleading guide to the effect of
world wide changes that would tighten the constraint imposed by the quota. US immigration
policy is represented by the variables in the fourth line of Table 3 (plus WH71-6 in the third line).
Merging the eastern and western hemispheres after 1976 sharply relaxed the constraint on
immigration from eastern hemisphere countries. By contrast the 1990 Immigration Act had
marginal effects, even when interacted with relative schooling levels to reflect the shift towards
positive selection on skills. Finally the effects of the IRCA legalization program over the years
1989 to 1991 is captured by a variable reflecting the estimated number of source country illegal
immigrants residing in the US in 1980. This effect doubled the Mexican immigration rate during
those years.
Migration in and from Africa
By far the world’s poorest continent, Africa has generated remarkably few migrants to
the major labor-scarce countries despite the massive gains that it would bring to the migrants.
True, migration pressure, as reflected by illegal flows between North Africa and southern Europe,
has often hit the headlines. Also, the share of Africans in legal immigration to the US has
increased. Yet, real incomes in Africa are but a tiny fraction of those in Europe and North
America so the incentive to emigrate should be huge. Indeed, the gaps are many times larger than
those that gave rise to the mass emigrations from Europe a century ago.18
There are three possible explanations for this apparent paradox. First, OECD immigration
policies that stress family reunification or skills impose high hurdles that serve to screen out
potential African migrants. This explanation is consistent with the finding that migrant stock
effects are large at very low levels. Second, the poverty constraint is sufficiently large to offset
the effect of large income gaps for most poor Africans. Third, Africans are simply less mobile
than populations elsewhere. We will start with the third of these possible explanations for the
paradoxically low African emigration rates to the labor-scarce OECD.
There is, of course, abundant evidence of coerced African migration. Large numbers
traveled as slaves across the Atlantic to the Americas from the seventeenth to the nineteenth
century. It was not until the 1880s that the cumulative flow of “free” Europeans exceeded that of
the coerced Africans (Eltis 1983). More recently Africa has become famous for its refugees.
While Africa accounts for a little more than a tenth of world population, it typically accounts for
more than a third of the world’s stock of refugees living in foreign countries. The number of
displaced persons is estimated at about 2.5 percent of the total African population. Typically,
these displaced Africans return to their homelands as soon as possible (Rogge 1994) because of
political motives, tribal and kinship ties, and the loss of cultural identity (Makanya 1994). Does
this suggest an unwillingness to migrate? Probably not since there is a more important force at
work: African refugees, often displaced into rural parts of bordering states, experience even
greater deprivation than they do at home.
The literature on migration within Africa suggests no lack of mobility.
10 It is worth citing
a few examples. One study of rural Botswana found a highly elastic and positive migration
response to wage rates and employment probabilities in the urban sector and a negative response
to local wage rates and employment probabilities (Lucas 1985). Another study found that rural–
urban migration in Kenya is strongly related to the wage gap and to the individual’s education
selecting those with higher education as a result of the greater economic return to education in the19
cities (Agesa 2001). But such is not always the case: emigration from Egypt to the Gulf states
selected those with few skills and without land. And there is little evidence to suggest that the
poorest laborers were constrained from migrating by poverty (Adams 1993: p. 162).
In recent research, we estimated the determinants of net migration to and from countries
across sub-Saharan Africa. The migration rates are inferred by demographic accounting where net
migration was simply calculated as a residual. Thus, we do not know where emigrants went or
where immigrants came from, but the vast bulk of the movements across African borders are not
overseas. Still, we have explained these net migration rates, illustrated by the regression in Table
4. The net outward movement of refugees is, of course, an important component of total African
cross-border movement although the estimated coefficient is less than one, perhaps because
refugees crowd out potential emigrants that would have moved for employment reasons in the
absence of the refugees. The share of the home country population aged 15 to 29 also has a
positive effect, indicating that a rise of five percentage points in the share of young adults (say
from 25 percent to 30 percent of the population) increases annual out-migration by one per
thousand.
The relative income variable is the purchasing power parity adjusted unskilled wage rate
and hence there is no need to adjust for differences in education. The foreign to home wage ratio
has a strong positive coefficient implying that a ten percent rise in the wage ratio increases net
out-migration by about one per thousand of the population, an impact similar to that for European
emigration a century ago (0.7 per thousand). While the growth of domestic output has a negative
effect on out-migration, the effect of the growth of output in other economies in the region seems
to have little impact. Finally, the poverty constraint, captured here by the inverse of the squared
home real wage, has a negative influence, but only significant at the ten percent level, implying
that the poverty constraint is weak. At the mean wage rate a ten percent increase in the real wage
increases out-migration by 0.2 per thousand, an effect that only partially offsets the one per
                                                                                                                                                                            
10 Valuable collections on African migration include Baker and Akin Aina (1995) and Appleyard (1998).20
thousand negative effect operating through the wage ratio. This contrasts with the finding for
immigration from Africa to the US where the poverty constraint effect more than offsets the
relative income effect.
11 But since most of the net migration reported in Table 4 is within Africa,
it makes sense that the poverty constraint would be a smaller impediment for cross-border
movements than it would be for trans-Atlantic migration.
Although these estimates are based on very crude macro data, they do seem to be
consistent with micro studies. Findlay and Sow (1998) studied rural households in the Senegal
River valley in Mali. They found that the poorer the family, the more likely its migrants would
remain in Africa—suggesting that poverty constraints were more important for migration out of
Africa. They also found that households with previous emigration experience in France were
more likely to send new migrants to France—suggesting that the friends and relatives effect
influenced the direction of those migrations. But immigration policy and economic conditions in
overseas destinations mattered too.
World Migration
Despite the disproportionate attention that has been given to immigration pressures on the
United States and other OECD countries, there have been other major migration streams around
the world. These too have been driven by a combination of demographic and economic
fundamentals as well as by political events. In eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet regime
led to large westward flows in the early 1990s from countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and
Russia itself. By 1993 the number of migrants from central and eastern Europe in the European
Union (excluding the German ausseidler) had risen to nearly two million (Bauer and
Zimmermann 1999: p. 6). These pressures abated somewhat by the late 1990s as the backlog
                                                          
11 The evidence from Germany also suggests that the poverty trap effect is strong for international migrants
from the poorest countries (Rotte and Vogler, 2000).21
cleared and conditions in these countries began to improve. Later in the decade, civil war in the
former Yugoslavia led to mass outflows, although many of the refugees ultimately returned
(OECD 2001a: pp. 68-86).
There have also been major currents of migration in Asia driven by demographic
pressures and changing income gaps. Until the middle of the 1980s one of the most important
magnets for Asian migrants were Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. Mass migration
from neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan that were also influenced by
wars and instability in the region (Shami 1999). The oil-rich states increasingly drew migrants
from further afield including East Asia and the Indian subcontinent—a trend that was halted by
the Gulf War. The economic miracles by the Asian tigers also resulted in major migration
movements. In countries like Korea and Malaysia, persistent net emigration was replaced by two-
way streams with falling outflows of natives and rising inflows of foreigners. Such trends were
halted, at least temporarily, by the financial crisis of 1997 and the sharp restrictions on
immigration that followed (OEDC: 2001b).
Similar forces seem to have been shaping world migration, and it is tempting to see how
well a simple migration model might explain them. Based on net immigration inferred from
demographic reconstructions, our results are sufficiently encouraging to suggest it would be
worthwhile to apply the technique more widely. The UN calculates annual average net
immigration rates over five year intervals for most countries. We have used these data to form a
panel of five-year periods 1970-1975 to 1995-2000 for 80 countries. The results of this exercise
appear in Table 5.
The share of population aged 15-29 in a receiving country has a negative effect on its
immigration, consistent with our findings for immigration to the US and cross-border migration
in Africa where a bigger young adult share raises emigration from sending countries. The
coefficient implies that a decrease in the receiving country young adult share from, say 30 to 25
percent, would increase its net immigration rate by 0.9 per thousand of the population. This big22
demographic effect is very close to what we found for emigration in sub-Saharan Africa. The
immigrant stock has a positive effect on net immigration and its size is consistent with the
estimates presented earlier. The coefficient implies that an increase of a thousand in the
immigrant stock increases net immigration by about 23 per annum. Refugee movements are
captured by a variable measuring the share of years during which the country was embroiled in
civil war. This was found to be the most important variable determining refugee displacements
across borders in Africa (Hatton and Williamson 2001). Here the effect of a civil war in the
receiving region reduces annual immigration (chiefly though refugee outflows) by about 2 per
thousand of the population.
Income effects are captured by two education-adjusted relative income terms, one relative
to the world as a whole and one relative to the region in which the country is located. These
variables are defined as GDP per capita for the country divided by a population-weighted average
for the world or the region minus the ratio of education years for the country relative to the world
or the region. The restriction that the GDP per capita ratios take equal and opposite signs to the
years of education ratios is comfortably accepted by the data.
12 These two variables represent the
effects on total net migration of income gaps relative to the world as a whole and within the
region. Both are positive so that a rise in domestic income relative to the world and relative to the
region both increase a country’s net immigration. A ten percent increase in education-adjusted
income raises immigration for the typical country by 0.12 per thousand from the worldwide
effects and by 0.09 per thousand for the regional effect. These combined effects are somewhat
smaller than those we found previously.
What about the poverty constraint? Here again the poverty constraint is proxied by the
gini coefficient of household income divided by the square of GDP per capita. Its effect should be
positive on net immigration if greater poverty leads to lower emigration and therefore higher net
immigration than otherwise. As before, because of the non-linearity, an increase in mean income23
has different effects at different income levels. For a typical African country, a ten percent
increase in education-adjusted income increases net immigration by 0.10 per thousand through
the two relative income effects but it also reduces net immigration by 0.16 per thousand. Thus, as
was suggested earlier, the effect of increasing incomes at home for the poorest countries, is to
increase net emigration (and therefore to reduce net immigration). Africa is the only region where
the overall effect of a rise in home income is negative for net immigration. The poverty constraint
effect is very small in western Europe, and thus the overall effect of a rise in home income is to
increase immigration by 0.31 per thousand. In other regions, the poverty constraint effect is
bigger. Thus, for South America the impact of a rise in home income is to increase immigration
by 0.13 per thousand; for the Caribbean 0.22 per thousand; and for East Asia 0.20 per thousand.
The Future for South-North and South-South Migration
Can estimates such as these be used to project the likely pattern of world migration over
the next two or three decades? It is important to recognize that the ex post migration streams that
we have analyzed are largely conditioned by immigration policies that serve as a filter between
the desire to migrate and the migration that actually takes place. The fact that economic and
demographic variables strongly influence world migration does not diminish the importance of
policy. Future trends are likely to be determined largely by policy choices. However, we can ask
how migration pressure is likely to develop. Clearly, if migration pressure increases and policy
regimes harden then ex post migration could be lower despite greater migration pressure. In that
case we might expect to see further increases in illegal migration, and perhaps a further escalation
of policies aimed at combating them.
In our analysis of African migration, we examined the effects of demographic trends on
migration pressure in the future. We used UN forecasts of the population size and age structure to
                                                                                                                                                                            
12 The computed F statistic for this restriction is 2.09 compared to the 5 percent critical value of 3.0.24
predict net migration rates for African countries into the future, taking account also of their
effects on real wage rates. Those projections suggest that migration pressure over the next 20
years should be increasing for demographic reasons alone. Assuming that a mere ten percent of
that additional predicted migration spilled out from sub-Saharan Africa, projected annual
emigration would increase by about a million between 1995 and 2025. While the absolute amount
of emigration pressure predicted may be debated, the direction of change is more secure. Any
prediction must deal with the uncertainties associated with the future course of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic, but it still seems clear that the demographic forces that drive African migration will
serve as a powerful engine to emigration pressure over the next 20 years.
Since immigration policy in the high-wage OECD and newly industrial countries will
play such a central role in the future of world migration, projections are uncertain. What is not
uncertain, however, are the economic and demographic fundamentals which have driven the
demand for world migration since 1850. To repeat, the big four are: gaps between rich high-wage
countries and poor low-wage countries; poverty constraints on the move in poor sending
countries; the size of the young adult share in sending and receiving country populations; and the
size of the foreign-born migrant stock from the sending counties currently residing in the
receiving countries. Three of these are on the rise, driving what might be called South-North
migration pressure upwards in the future. First, successful development and poverty eradication
in the Third World (Dollar and Kraay 2000; Chen and Ravallion 2001; Sala-i-Matin 2002;
Lindert and Williamson 2002) will most certainly release the poverty constraint on potential
emigrants from the poorest parts of the world, like China, South Asia, the Asian interior and
Africa. Second, while the catching up of canonical labor surplus parts of the world – like China
and India – on the OECD (Lindert and Williamson 2002) will reduce the motivation for the
move, it looks like Africa will not be part of that catching up. In any case, there may be an
unrequited demand for the move which past policy restrictions have choked off temporarily, but
is still latent. Third, there is the growing imbalance between the shrinking young adult shares in25
the OECD and the rising young adult shares in South Asia, Africa and other parts of the Third
World where the demographic transition has been delayed. This imbalance played an important
role in driving world migration in the past, and it should do so in the future too. Fourth, as
foreign-born migrants increase as a share of total residents in high-wage countries, the pressure
on annual immigration flows will rise too. In short, if OECD countries think they have a
immigration problem now, they are going to find the future even more challenging.
We conclude with a word about South-South migration. How long will it be before
successful development will shift the target of the emigrating poor from OECD labor markets to
those which have recently arrived or shortly will have arrived on the industrial scene? After all,
there may be more skills to learn in a newly industrial country’s manufacturing job, which is also
closer to the poor sending region, than in a post-industrial country’s domestic service job, which
is also farther away. These opportunities will most assuredly change the direction of South-North
flows in a more South-South direction, easing the pressure on OECD migration policy, but
creating new problems for the newly industrial country. The future rise of South-South migration
will, no doubt, take those analysts who ignore history by surprise. It will not take economic
historians by surprise. After all, when those 50 million Europeans left home before 1914, there
were at the same time far more than 50 million who left China and India for jobs elsewhere in the
periphery. South-South migration is not new. It is just ignored by economists.
13
                                                          
13  W Arthur Lewis (1978) had plenty to say about South-South migration, but not many other economists
have followed his lead. However, the two of us are starting a South-South migration since 1850 project
which we hope will redress the balance.26
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Table 1: Regression Estimate for Emigration from Europe, 1860-1913
MigRate   =  −  6.08  −  4.57 AgShare  −  6.86 LnWRatio + 0.37 LagBirth
                       (3.3)      (1.3)                   (4.4)                      (3.5)
                     + 0.22 MigStock + 5.64 Dum;     Adj. R2 = 0.69
                        (8.4)                    (4.7)
Note t statistics in parentheses.
Sample Decade-average observations for an unbalanced panel comprising (no of obs): Belgium 1860-
1913 (5); Denmark 1880-1913 (3); France 1870-1913; Germany 1970-1913 (4); Great Britain 1860-
1913 (5); Ireland 1860-1913 (5); Italy 1880-1913 (3); Netherlands 1860-1913 (5); Norway 1880-1913
(3); Portugal 1870-1913 (4); Spain 1890-1913 (2); Sweden 1860-1913 (5).
Variable definitions: MigRate = gross emigration rate per thousand population per decade to all foreign
destinations; Agshare = share of labour force in agriculture; LnWRatio = log of the ratio of purchasing
power parity adjusted wage rates, source country to a weighted average of destination countries;
LagBirth = source country birth rate lagged 20 years; Migstock = stock of previous immigrants in
destination countries at beginning of decade per thousand of source country population; Dum = dummy
for Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Method Pooled OLS regression on 48 country/period observations.
Source Hatton and Williamson (1998), column 4, Table 3.3, p. 39.
Table 2: Source Area composition of US Immigration, 1951-99 (% of total)
Region of Origin 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-9
Europe 52.7 33.8 17.8 10.3 14.9
      West 47.1 30.2 14.5 7.2 5.7
      East 5.6 3.6 3.3 3.1 9.2
Asia 6.1 12.9 35.3 37.3 30.8
Americas 39.6 51.7 44.1 49.3 49.7
      Canada 15.0 12.4 3.8 2.1 2.1
      Mexico 11.9 13.7 14.2 22.6 25.3
      Caribbean 4.9 14.2 16.5 11.9 10.8
      Central America 1.8 3.1 3.0 6.4 5.6
      South America 3.6 7.8 6.6 6.3 5.9
Africa 0.6 0.9 1.8 2.4 3.8
Oceania 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.6
Total (000's) 2,515 3,322 4,493 7,338 7,605
Source: 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 2.
Notes: Immigrants classified by country of last residence. Percentages exclude the category "origin not
specified". Western Europe is defined as the countries of the European Union, excluding Finland but
including Norway and Switzerland. East Europe includes the category "Other Europe".32
Table 3: Regression Estimate for US Immigration, 1971-1998
LnMigRate =   − 11.95 −  1.80 Ypc(f/h) + 2.61 Sch(f/h) + 4.17 Gini(f/h)
                          (35.9)    (9.5)                (12.7)               (7.1)
            −  1.57 (Gini(f/h)
2 −  2.71 Sp15-29 −  0.18 Dist  + 1.11 Englp −  0.31 Landlk
               (6.5)                     (2.7)                 (12.3)          (15.4)              (7.0)
            + 42.91 ImStck −   182.94 (ImStck)
2 −  0.36 Pov + 0.06 WH71-6
              (10.7)                     (6.5)                    (3.9)           (0.8)
             −  0.42 EH71-6  −  0.01 D92-8  + 0.14 D92-8*Sch + 0.05 IRCA;   R
2 = 0.77
              (6.3)                    (0.1)               (0.8)                        (2.9)
Note: robust t statistics in parentheses.
Sample: Balanced panel of number of immigrants to the US by country/year 1971-98. Regional
composition (no of countries): Western Europe (16); Eastern Europe (6); East Asia (14); Middle East
(5); North America (2); Caribbean (4); Central America (6); South America (11); Africa (14); Oceania
(3).
Variable definitions: LnMigRate = log of the ratio of immigrants admitted by country of birth per
thousand of source country population; Ypc(f/h) = ratio of GDP per capita at 1985 PPP, source country
to US; Sch(f/h) = ratio of years of schooling for those aged 15 and over, source country to US; Sp15-29
= share of source country population aged 15-29; Gini(f/h) = ratio of gini coefficient of household
income, source country to US; Dist = great circle distance from Chicago in 1000 miles; Englp =
dummy equals 1 if source country is predominantly English speaking.; Landlk = dummy equals 1 if
source country is landlocked; ImStck = stock of immigrants in the US from source country per
thousand of source country population; Pov = source country gini coefficient/source country income
per capita squared; WH71-6 = dummy equals 1 for western hemisphere countries times dummy equals
1 for 1971-6; EH71-6 = dummy equals 1 for eastern hemisphere countries times dummy equals 1 for
1971-6; D92-8 = dummy equals 1 for 1992-98; D92-8*Sch = D92-8 times years of schooling ratio;
IRCA = estimated number of illegal immigrants residing in the US in 1980 per thousand of source
country population times dummy =1 for 1989-91.
Method: Pooled OLS regression on 2268 country/year observations. Dummies for Canada, Mexico and
8 regions (with Western Europe as the excluded group) included but not reported.
Source: This is a variant of the model presented in Clark, Hatton and Williamson  (2002). Further
details of data sources and methods are available there.33
Table 4: Regression Estimate for African Net Migration, 1977-95
NetMigRate = − 58.45 + 0.47 NetRef + 10.02 LnWRatio(f/h) + 2.11 Sp15-29
                           (2.4)    (3.1)                (2.9)                              (2.4)
                        −  0.53 grY(h) + 0.04 grY(f) −  1.46 Pov  ;      R
2 = 0.53
(2.0)               (0.2)               (1.7)
Note: robust t statistics in parentheses.
Sample: Unbalanced panel of country/years comprising: Angola 1982-95; Burundi 1980-5; Cameroon
1980-95; Central African Republic 1989-95; Chad 1980-95; Côte d’Ivoire 1989-95; Gabon 1977-90;
Ghana 1977-95; Lesotho, 1981-95; Malawi 1987-95; Mali 1987-95; Nigeria 1977-95; Rwanda 1979-
95; Senegal 1989-95; Sierra Leone 1991-5; Sudan 1984-95; Swaziland 1978-95; Togo 1982-93;
Zambia 1981-95; Zimbabwe 1983-95.
Variable definitions: NetMigRate = net out-migration per thousand of population; NetRef = net
outflow of refugees per thousand of population; LnWRatio = ratio of real unskilled wage rates at 1990
PPP, foreign to home, where the foreign index is a weighted average regional (0.9) and OECD (0.1)
wage rates; grY(h) = growth rate of real GDP per capita in home country; grY(f) index of growth rate
of GDP in the region, where the African regions are west, east, middle and south; Pov = inverse of
home real wage squared.
 Method: Pooled OLS regression on 265 country/year observations. Dummies for Ghana 1983 and
1985 and Nigeria 1983 and 1985 included but not reported.   
Source: This is a variant of the model presented in Hatton and Williamson (2001). Further details of
data sources and methods are available there.34
Table 5: Regression Estimate of Net Immigration for 80 countries 1970-2000
NetMigRate = 2.65 −  0.18 Sp15-29 +  0.23 ImStck −  2.05 CivWar
                      (1.3)     (2.3)                   (7.1)                (2.7)
                    + 0.89 (YpcW – SchW)(h/f) + 0.72 (YpcR − SchR)(h/f) + 1.49 Pov
(3.0)  (4.8)                                    (2.2)
                    R
2 = 0.26
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
Sample: Balanced panel of five year averages 1970-5 to 1995-2000 for 80 countries. Regional
composition (no of countries): Western Europe (16); Eastern Europe (6); East Asia (14); Middle East
(5); North America (2); Caribbean (4); Central America (6); South America (9); Africa (14); Oceania
(3).
Variable definitions: NetMigRate = net immigration per thousand of the population per annum, five
year average; Sp 15-29 = percentage of population aged 15-29, five year average; ImStck = percentage
of foreign-born in the country, beginning of period; CivWar = proportion of civil war years in period;
(YpcW− SchW)(h/f) = five year average of ratio of county GDP per capita at 1985 ppp divided by the
weighted average GDP per capita of all other countries, minus five year average of ratio of country
years of education for those aged 15 and over divided by the weighted average years of education of all
other countries; (YpcR− SchR)(h/f) = five year average of ratio of county GDP per capita at 1985 ppp
divided by the weighted average GDP per capita of other countries in the same region, minus five year
average of ratio of country years of education for those aged 15 and over divided by the weighted
average years of education of other countries in the region; Pov = average ratio of country gini
coefficient divided by per capita income squared.
Method: Pooled OLS regression on 480 country/period observations.
 Source: Net migration rates from World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, New York: United
Nations, 2001. Immigrants stock from National Population Policies 2001, New York: United Nations,
2002.  The sources for other variables are as in Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002).